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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, citizens are demanding new ways of taking part on political decisions.
Movements such Occupy Wall Street (OWS) in the United States or 15-M in
Spain include in their principles to engage in a more transparent and direct
citizen participation in the decision-making process.
We present a model in which two parties with di¤erent institutional orga-
nizations compete to win elections. There will be a party representing a case
of Participatory Democracy, which combines elements from both Direct and
Representative Democracy.1 In this party, citizens have the ultimate power to
decide on who is going to assume the role of policy implementation. This party
will be referred as Party B. Its opponent, Party A, represents the typical down-
sian model where the candidate location will be given by the strategy which
guarantees its victory. Both parties share a common aim which is to obtain
more votes than the opponent party and win elections.
In this paper, we evaluate the possibilities of a party representing Participa-
tory Democracy to win elections. This party di¤ers considerably of the typical
decision process carried out by traditional parties. First, an assembly should
be held, to take into account the di¤erent policy positions of the citizens. Sec-
ond, it uses elements of Participatory Democracy. We use the citizen-candidate
concept developed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996). Thus, we allow any citizen
who wishes to state his point of view, his ideas and his ideal policy position,
in which we will be focused on. Any citizen-candidate will assume a cost and
will hold a benet in case of taking o¢ ce. Another element of Participatory
Democracy is the fact that any citizen can vote to that citizen-candidate who
best represents his policy preferences. Additionally, there is an element of Rep-
resentative Democracy, as the citizen-candidates elected at the assembly will
represent their ideal and sincere voting policy position. This will be the policy
of Party B. Due to uncertainty about the nal number of citizen-candidates,
Party B will be evaluated by the citizens as a lottery LB .
We start adding a variable which represents the valence characteristic of each
of the parties, A and B ; as used at the work of Aragonés and Palfrey (2002).
We study which kind of policies will be o¤ered by the parties according to their
valence advantage over its opponent. We also take into account situations in
which uncertainty in valence advantage will limit the strategies of both parties.
In general, we study two cases. Firstly, we are going to consider that citizens
with right to vote will assist to the assembly. Therefore, the median voter of
the assembly will be equal to the median voter of the electorate. Secondly, we
study a more realistic case, in which only the citizens who wishes to, will assist
to the assembly. Thus, we will have situations where the median voter of the
assembly can be located at any position of the policy space.
1See Aragonès and Sanchez-Pagés (2009) for a more detailed description of some forms of
participatory democracy.
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We nish analyzing whether a multi-candidate representation of Party B can
a¤ect positively to its chances of winning elections. We study the particular case
for three and four candidates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
formal model. Section 3 provides the results for the case of two-leader assembly.
Section 4 analyzes the case of two-leader assembly when the assembly median
voter does not coincide with the median voter of the electorate. Section 5
analyzes the case of more than two-leader assembly. Finally, Section 6 contains
some concluding remarks.
2 Model
A general election is going to be held, in which voters will elect one out of two
political parties. The two competing political parties are denoted by Party A
and Party B. These parties di¤er in the institutional structure they support.
Party A is a traditional party that announces its political platform before the
election and has a clear leader that represents the candidacy of the party. Party
B is not a traditional party in the sense that it neither defends a clear political
platform, nor a leader. The only statement that Party B proposes is the defense
of participatory democracy. By participatory democracy, if Party B wins the
elections, the party will organize an assembly to choose their policy and leader.
This implies that, during the electoral campaign, there is uncertainty on the
policy that Party B will implement in the case of winning the elections.
Policy space and voters
The policy space is continuous and one dimensional. We take without loss
of generality the interval [0; 1]. The continuum of voters have symmetric single-
peaked preferences over the policy space. The ideal policies of voters are dis-
tributed over [0; 1] according to a continuous distribution F . Let xi 2 [0; 1] be
the ideal policy of voter i and let xM 2 [0; 1] be the ideal policy of the median
voter.
Political Parties
The two political parties competing to win elections are denoted by j 2
fA;Bg : Party A represents the "downsian" party which o¤ers a particular pol-
icy xA 2 [0; 1] as to win the elections. Party B, on the contrary, defends Par-
ticipatory Democracy. As a rst step, we consider that all the citizens attend
the assembly. We later analyze the case in which citizens decide whether or
not to attend this. In the assembly, citizens can become leaders by proposing
political positions. After which, the assembly will vote over these proposals and
by plurality rule, the policy obtaining more votes wins. Voters are assumed to
vote sincerely at the assembly, and preferences over policies are represented by
vi (xk) =   jxk   xij (1)
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where xk is the policy proposed by leader k at the assembly. Following Osborne
and Slivinsky (1996), when citizen with ideal position xk becomes leader, the
payo¤ derived by her decision is represented by the following function:
b  c if she wins
  jxw   xij   c if she loses (2)
where c > 0 is the cost of becoming leader, b > 0 is the benet of winning in
the assembly and xw is the ideal policy of the winner at the assembly.
An assembly Nash-equilibrium is a set of m > 0 policies, each of which
proposed by a leader such that no other leader strictly improves either proposing
a new policy or dropping out his policy proposal.
For the duration of the electoral campaign, voters share a common belief
about the outcome of the assembly. This belief is represented by a set of m poli-
cies XB =

x1B ; :::; x
m
B
	 2 [0; 1]m and a vector of probabilities, p = (p1; :::; pm),
where each pk > 0, is the probability that voters assign to the policy of leader
k; xkB , to be elected in the assembly. Therefore, p1 + ::: + pm = 1. We order
this set so that x1B < x
2
B < ::: < x
m
B . Thus, because there is uncertainty on
the outcome of the assembly, Party B is evaluated by voters according to the
lottery LB = fXB ; pg :
Besides, each party is associated with a valence characteristic A; B > 0;
that represents the popularity and a¢ nity that voters show towards Party A
and Party B respectively.
Voting decisions and equilibrium
Let ui be the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility representation of the
preferences of voter i over policy proposals and valence characteristics:
ui
 
xj ; j

= j   jxj   xij : (3)
Given the policy of Party A, xA; and the lottery of Party B, LB = fXB ; pg ;
agent i votes at the general election for party A when:
ui (xA; A) > E [ui (LB ; B)] ; (4)
which is equivalent to
A   jxA   xij > B  
mX
k=1
pk
xkB   xi (5)
If the agent is indi¤erent between both parties, he abstains from voting.
Otherwise, agent i votes for party B.
Party A aims at winning the elections, that is, Party A is a pure o¢ ce-
seeking political party. The following function represents the objective of Party
A:
V (xA; LB;A; B) =

1 if Party A wins
0 otherwise
(6)
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Thus, Party A only derives benets when winning the general election. Ob-
serve that Party B will have a similar objective, winning the elections, however,
given that beliefs over the assembly outcome and the valence characteristic are
exogenously given, Party B has no strategic tool to win the elections.
Next, we introduce the equilibrium concept that accounts for the strategic
behavior of Party A to select its platform, and the strategic entry of leaders at
the assembly proposed by Party B in the case of winning the general election.
Denition: A political equilibrium is a policy for Party A, xA; and a lottery
for Party B, LB = fXB ; pg ; such that:
i) XB is an assembly Nash-equilibrium and p is the associated vector of winning
probabilities.
ii) xA is a best response to the expected assembly outcome of Party B repre-
sented by LB .
Our notion of political equilibrium requires that beliefs on the assembly
outcome be consistent with the citizen-candidate approach. This requirement
does not provide unique equilibrium prediction regarding the assembly outcome,
but discards those locations of platforms and their associated probabilities that
cannot be sustained by the individual incentives derived from winning at the
assembly.
3 Two-leader assembly
First, we analyze the case in which voters belief that just two leaders will show
up at the assembly. According to the citizen-candidate model, we can describe
those policy positions and winning probabilities that can be sustained as Nash-
equibrium at the assembly.
Lemma 1 (Osborne and Slivinsky 1996) In every two-leader assembly Nash-
equilibrium the leaders choose symmetric positions with respect to the median
voter, i.e. x1B = xM   " and x2B = xM + "; where " 2 (0; ") and the winning
probabilities coincide p1 = p2:
The upper bound " is dened as to avoid the entrance of a third leader
in between the two others. Thus, " depends upon the distribution of votes
and guarantees that for all " < ", there is no policy position in the interval
[xM   "; xM + "] such that, according to sincere voting, this position is strictly
preferred by more than 1/3 of the total voters.
Next, we derive the electoral result at the general election depending on the
valence characteristic of the political parties.
Proposition 1 In every political equilibrium with two expected leaders at the
assembly:
if A  B Party A always wins the elections.
if A < B Party A wins the elections if and only if B   A < "2 :
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Proof. Step 1: We show that when A  B ; Party A wins locating at
xA = xM :
First, we show that when A  B any strategy xA guarantees the victory of
Party A. We consider the case in which Party A locates at the median voter
position xA = xM ; and Party B candidates are located in XB =
 
x1B ; x
2
B

;
with probability p =
 
1
2 ;
1
2

: First, we start analyzing the voting decision of
a citizen located in xi 2 [0; xM   "] : There, the utility of voting Party A is
U (xA) = A   jxM   xij and U (xB) = B   12ui
 
x1B   xi

+ 12ui
 
x2B   xi

=
B   jxM   xij : As A > B , they vote for Party A. Second, if the voter po-
sition is xi 2 [xM   "; xM ] then he obtains that U (xA) = A   jxM   xij >
B   12ui
 
xi   x1B

+ 12ui
 
x2B   xi

= B   " and will also vote for Party A as
A  B implies that A  B   ". Likewise, a citizen located at the median
voter position xi = xM ; will also vote for Party A. Symmetrically, xi 2 [xM ; 1]
will also vote for Party A. Thus, Party A will win unanimously. We can apply
this analysis to any strategy of Party A: xA 2

x1B ; x
2
B

: In case A = B ; Party
A wins only with the support of xi 2 [xM   "; xM + "] as any citizen located in
xi 2 [0; xM   "] and xi 2 [xM + "; 1] will be indi¤erent.
Step 2: We show that when A < B and B   A < "2 ; Party A wins locating
at xA = xM   "2 :
When A < B , Party A can win locating at xA = xM   "2 : First, we consider
that the voter position is xi 2 [0; xM   "]. Then, U (xA) = A   jxA   xij =
A  
xM   "2   xi and U (xB) = B   12ui  x1B   xi+ 12ui  x2B   xi = B  jxM   xij : Comparing utilities, we nd that B   A < "2 and xi supports
Party A. The same result is obtained by xi 2

xM   "; xM   "2

and xi 2
xM   "2 ; xM

; who will also vote for Party A. If the citizen locates at the
median voter position xi = xM he will vote for Party A as U (xA) = A +
"
2 >
U (xB) = B : Thus, Party A can win even with a less valence advantage leader.
Step 3: We show that when A < B and B   A  "2 ; Party A cannot win
at any location.
When A < B Party A cannot win at any location if the condition B  
A  "2 is applied. First, we start analyzing the case in which Party A de-
cides to locate in xA = xM : For each citizen xi 2 [0; xM   "] ; he obtains
U (xA) = A   jxM   xij and U (xB) = B   12ui
 
x1B   xi

+ 12ui
 
x2B   xi

=
B   jxM   xij : The restriction A < B implies that they will vote for Party
B. For any citizen xi 2 [xM   "; xM ] Party A gives U (xA) = A   jxM   xij
and Party B U (xB) = B   ": Thus, it is necessary to satisfy the condition
B   A  "2 to vote for Party B. Finally, the same is applied if the citizen
i is the median voter, xi = xM : Thus, Party A cannot win under the strat-
egy xA = xM : Second, we take xA = xM   "2 as the strategy of Party A.
If xi 2 [0; xM   "] ; then U (xA) = A   jxA   xij = A  
xM   "2   xi and
U (xB) = B jxM   xij. This implies that A 
xM   "2   xi < B jxM   xij
and B   A  "2 is satised. Meanwhile, when xi 2

xM   "; xM   "2

citizen
xi obtains A  
xM   "2   xi < B   "; which implies that B   A  "2 and
Party B obtains support. By symmetry, xi 2

xM   "2 ; xM

will also vote for
6
AB bb -
Party A wins e
2
ebb =- AB
Party A wins
Party B wins
Figure 1: Results of Proposition 1.
B. In case xi = xM the condition B   A  "2 is also satised and xi 2 [0; xM ]
will make Party B to win when Party A locates at xA = xM   "2 :
This result gives a clear prediction of the party winning at the general elec-
tion as a function of the di¤erence in the valence characteristic. Figure 1 repre-
sents the results of Proposition 1. In this gure we clearly deduce how "a priori",
Party A has more chances to win: whereas a valence advantage for party A over
B (i.e., B   A < 0) assures the victory of Party A, the valence advantage for
Party B over A (i.e., B  A > 0) cannot guarantee the victory of Party B. As
Figure 1 shows, however, the smaller the value of " is, the higher the chances of
Party B to win at the general election. That is, the more moderate, in expected
terms, are the leaders at the assembly, the higher the probability of Party B to
win the general election.
We deduce, therefore, a necessary condition for Party B to win at the general
election: Party B needs some advantage with respect to Party A in terms of
valence characteristic, i.e. B   A > 0: Besides, the smaller this advantage,
the more moderate (in expected terms) the leaders at the assembly should be
to guarantee the victory of Party B. Hence, the higher this advantage, the
more extremist (in expected terms) the leaders at the assembly can be without
abandoning the electoral victory. This observation is highlighted in our following
result.
Corollary 1: Suppose that Party B has a valence advantage (i.e., B A > 0):
Then, there is a xed distance between the two leaders at the assembly (measured
by 2"), below which Party B can guarantee its victory. Besides, the higher
B A the higher is this distance, i.e. the more polarized the assembly proposals
can be.
Because the leaders at the assembly symmetrically locate around the ideal
policy of the median voter, our result establish that closer locations around this
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median are needed when the advantage of Party B is low. Thus, too polarized
positions (in expected terms) can generate electoral default when the advantage
of Party B over Party A is not too large.
So far, we have just paid attention to describing which party can win the
general election. Next, we want to describe the equilibrium location of Party A
as a function of the valence characteristic of the political parties. As we show in
our following result, when B   A < 0; Party A has some exibility regarding
the location that guarantees its victory.
Lemma 2 If A  B ; Party A can lose the elections locating its platform
at either xA 2 [0; xM   ") or xA 2 (xM + "; 1] : However, every location xA 2
(xM   "; xM + ") guarantees its electoral victory.
Proof. We take that the valence characteristic is equal for both Parties, i.e.,
A = B : We start supposing that xA 2 [0; xM   "). Then, for every agent i
with ideal policy xi 2 [0; xM   "] ; xi obtains u (xA; A) = A   jxA   xij >
u (xB ; B) = B   jxM   xij : Thus, Party A obtains the vote of these agents.
For every agent with ideal policy xi 2 [xM   "; xM ], we have that u (xA; A) =
A jxi   xAj whereas u(xB) = B  ": In this case, depending on the distance
jxi   xAj they may prefer one or the other political party. In particular, those
agents which ideal policy xi satises that jxi   xAj > " will opt for Party B.
Finally, for any voter with ideal policy xi 2 [xM ; 1], Party B is preferred to
Party A. This implies that if A  B Party A can lose in xA 2 [0; xM   ") and
xA 2 (xM + "; 1] : Conversely, if xA 2 (xM   "; xM + ") and A = B Party A
wins. We show that using xA = xM ; every voter which ideal policy located at
xi 2 [0; xM   "] and xi 2 [xM + "; 1] abstain from voting as u (xA; A) = A  
jxA   xij = u (xB;B) = B jxM   xij : For those voters with ideal policy xi 2
[xM   "; xM ] ; they prefer Party A because jxA   xij < j "j. Symmetrically,
xi 2 [xM ; xM   "] will also vote for Party A.
When Party A does not have valence advantage, i.e., when B   A > 0;
Party A can only win by supporting certain political positions within the interval
[xM   "; xM + "] : As shown in Proposition 1, there are some cases in which, no
matter the location of Party B, Party A cannot win at the general election.
Lemma 3: If A < B ; Party A lose the elections locating its platform at
either xA 2 [0; xM   ") or xA 2 (xM + "; 1]. If B   A < "2 ; then either
xA = xM   "2 or xA = xM + "2 can guarantee the victory of Party A.
Proof. The rst part was proved in Lemma 2, where we showed that even with
valence advantage A  B Party A can lose in xA 2 [0; xM   ") and xA 2
(xM + "; 1] : Indeed, we deduce that when Party A has no valence advantage
over Party B A < B Party A cannot win either. If we focus on the second
part of Lemma 3, we obtain that it is possible for Party A to win locating at
xA = xM   "2 or xA = xM + "2 if and only if B   A < "2 : We assume that
Party A locates at xA = xM   "2 : Then, any citizen xi 2 [0; xM   "] will obtain
that u (xA; A) = A  
xM   "2   xi and u (xB ; B) = B   jxM   xij : If we
compare utilities, we obtain that B A < "2 is satised and they vote for Party
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A. Taking xi = xM we get that u (xA; A) = A  
xM    xM   "2 = A   "2
and u (xB ; B) = B "; so B A < "2 is also satised. Thus, the median voter
also vote for Party A. We can spread the voting decision to xA 2 [xM   "; xM ] :
The proof for the case in which xA = xM + "2 is analogue.
In order to derive a unique equilibrium prediction regarding the political
platform of Party A, we suppose that Party A is uncertain about the advantage
that gathers with respect to Party B. In this case, Party A will locate in that
political position that maximizes its expected probability of winning.
Proposition 2 If Party A is uncertain about its advantage over Party B, then
in every two-leader political equilibrium either xA = xM   "2 or xA = xM + "2 :
Proof. The objective function of Party A is dened by Expression (6) hence,
Party A only derives benets from winning the elections. As shown in Lemma 2,
the strategies xA 2 (xM   "; xM + ") make Party A win for A  B :Moreover,
by Lemma 3 xA = xM   "2 or xA = xM + "2 guarantees the electoral victory of
Party A when A < B with B   A < "2 : Since xM   "2 2 (xM   "; xM + ")
and xM + "2 2 (xM   "; xM + ") ; the political positions xA = xM   "2 and
xA = xM +
"
2 guarantee the victory of Party A at the general election when
there is uncertainty about the valence advantage. By Proposition 1, Party
A cannot win the election when B   A  "2 and, in this case, Party A is
indi¤erent between every policy position according to its objective function as
it is not going to win. We conclude that xA = xM   "2 and xA = xM + "2 are
therefore, the positions that maximize the probability of winning of Party A.
4 Two-leader assembly: the assembly median
voter
In the previous section, we analyzed the case in which voters belief that just
two leaders will show up at the assembly and leaders were symmetrically located
around the median voter (Lemma 1). In addition, we took for granted that all
the citizens attended the assembly to elect the Party B candidate.
Now, we want to consider a more realistic scenario where not all the voters
assist to the assembly. We still maintain the assembly Nash-equilibrium con-
cept of Lemma 1. Hence, the previous section is a particular case in which the
median voter position of both the assembly and the electorate were the same.
Now, we make a distinction between both. We now dene the assembly median
voter position as xaM : From now on, xM will be referred as the electorate me-
dian voter position. Through this section, we consider that the partiesvalence
characteristic coincide, i.e., A = B :
Lemma 4: In every two-leader assembly Nash-equilibrium leaders choose sym-
metric positions with respect to the assembly median voter, i.e. x1B = x
a
M " and
x2B = x
a
M + "; where " 2 (0; ") and the winning probabilities coincide p1 = p2:
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KA = KB xMa 5 Ý0, xM ? PÞ xMa 5 ÝxM ? P, xMÞ xMa = xM xMa 5 ÝxM,xM + PÞ xMa 5 ÝxM + P, 1Þ
xA 5 Ý0,xM ? PÞ A/B B B B
xA 5 ÝxM ? P,xMÞ A A/B A A A
xA = xM A A A A A
xA 5 ÝxM, xM + PÞ A A A A/B A
xA 5 ÝxM + P, 1Þ B B B A/B
Figure 2: Results of the election according to the assembly median voter posi-
tion.
Next, we derive the electoral result at the general election depending on the
location of the assembly median voter position, xaM .
Proposition 3 In every political equilibrium with two expected leaders at the
assembly:
i) if xA 2 (xM   "; xM + ") Party A always wins the elections.
ii) if xA  xM ; Party A wins the elections if and only if xA  xaM :
iii) if xA  xM ; Party A wins the elections if and only if xA  xaM :
Proof. First, we show that any strategy xA 2 (xM   "; xM + ") guarantees
the victory of Party A if ii and iii of Proposition 4 are satised. In Figure 2
we obtain the results of the elections depending on the location of the assembly
median voter position xaM and the location of the candidate of Party A, xA.
In Figure 2, we can see the results of the elections for any possible locations
of Party A, xA, and Party B, XB = (xaM   "; xaM + "). At each row, we show
the di¤erent strategies of Party A, xA; respect to the electorate median voter
position, xM : On the contrary, all the possible locations of the assembly median
voter, xaM ; are shown in columns. For instance, if the assembly-median voter
is located at xaM 2 (xM   "; xM ) the best strategy for Party A is to o¤er a
policy located at the electorate-median voter position xA = xM or any at xA 2
(xM   "; xM + ") satisfying condition ii). Thus, A stands for the victory of
Party A and B the defeat . In the cases represented by A=B; both parties can
win. Its victory will depend upon the exact location of xA with respect to xaM :
Specically for that strategy, Party A wins if xA  xaM ; and B otherwise. For
xA 2 (0; xM ) Party A wins if xA  xaM : Symmetrically, for any policy location
of Party A such that xA 2 (xM ; 1) Party A cannot be defeated if xA  xaM :
Empty cells in Figure 2 indicates a tie between both parties.
Step 1: Show that B represents the cases where Party B wins.
We consider the case in which Party A locates at xA 2 (0; xM   ") and Party
B candidates are located inXB = [xaM   "; xaM + "] ; with xaM 2 (xM   "; xM + ")
and probability p =
 
1
2 ;
1
2

: We start analyzing the voting decision of the elec-
torate median voter position, xM as its decision will be the same of those
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candidates located at xi 2 (xM + "; 1) : Considering the case in which xA =
x1B = xM   3"2 : If the electorate median voter votes for Party A, he obtains
U (xA) = A jxM   (xM   ")j = A  3"2 < U (xB) = B  12 jxM   (xaM   ")j 
1
2 jxM   (xaM + ")j = B  12
xM    xM   3"2   12 xM + "2   (xM ) = B ": Therefore, any citizen
xi 2 (xM + "; 1) will also vote for Party B. We can extrapolate this analysis to
any assembly median voter location xaM 2 (xM   "; 1). Additionally,the strategy
xA 2 (xM + "; 1) show the same results and Party A cannot win either.
Step 2: Show that A represents the cases where Party A wins.
We consider the case in which Party A locates at the electorate median voter
position xA = xM and Party B candidates are located inXB = (xaM   "; xaM   ")
with xaM = xM and probability p =
 
1
2 ;
1
2

: We study the voting decision of
the electorate median voter position, xi = xM . xM will vote for Party A as
U (xA) = A   jxM   (xM )j = A > U (xB) =
B   12 jxM   (xaM   ")j   12 jxaM + "  xM j = B   12 jxM   (xM   ")j  
1
2 jxM + "  xM j = B   ": As the electorate median voter supports Party A,
Party A wins obtaining the support of xi 2 (xM   "; xM + ") as citizens out of
this space will be indi¤erent between both parties. This analysis is equivalent
to any case denoted by A in Figure 2. That is, for any xA 2 (xM   "; xM + ")
where condition II of Proposition (4) is satised.
Step 3: Show that A/B represents the cases in which Party A wins satisfying
condition II.
We consider one of the cases in which we nd A/B in Figure 2. Suppose
Party A locates at xA 2 (xM   "; xM ) and Party B candidates are located in
xaM 2 (xM   "; xM ) ; with probability p =
 
1
2 ;
1
2

:We start analyzing a situation
in which xA = xaM : For instance, xA = x
a
M = xM   "2 : In this case the electorate
median voter xM will vote for Party A as U (xA) = A  
xM    xM   "2 =
A   "2 > U (xB) = B   12 jxM   (xaM   ")j   12 jxM   (xaM + ")j =
B   12
xM    xM   3"2    12 xM + "2   xM  = B   ": This decision will
be the same as those candidates located at xi 2 (xaM   "; xaM + ") : Conversely,
any citizen xi 2 (xaM + "; 1) and xi 2 (0; xaM   ") will be indi¤erent between
both parties as the utility obtained by each agent is equal, as xA = xaM :
We have shown that for xA = xaM ; Party A wins when both parties shares
the same platform. Therefore, for xA 2 (0; xM ) a strategy xA  xaM will guar-
antee the victory of Party A. We are going to show it by contradiction. Sup-
pose the same prior case where xA 2 (xM   "; xM ) and xaM 2 (xM   "; xM )
but now xA < xaM : We can take xA = xM   2"3 and xaM = xM   "2 : In
this case the electorate median voter xM will vote for Party B as U (xA) =
A  
xM    xM   2"3  = A   2"3 < U (xB) = B   12 xM    xM   3"2   
1
2
xM + "2   xM  = B   ": Therefore, any citizen xi 2 (xM + "; 1) will vote
for Party B as they will also obtain more utility for voting Party B rather than
Party A. Thus, we have shown the importance of satisfying condition II and
III: for any strategy of Party A at platform xA 2 (0; xM ) it is necessary to
satisfy xA  xaM to guarantee the victory of Party A and for Party A platform
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xA 2 (xM ; 1) Party A needs to locate xA  xaM to win.
Step 4: Show that empty cells of Figure 2 represents a tie between Party A
and Party B.
We consider the case in which Party A locates at xA 2 [0; xM   "] and Party
B candidates are located in XB = [xM + "; 1] ; with probability p =
 
1
2 ;
1
2

: As
the aim of both parties is to win elections, Party A will locate at the limit of the
platform, xA = xM   " and we consider that the assembly median voter is also
located at the limit of its actual platform, xaM = xM + ": The voting decision
of the electorate median voter position, xM : We obtain that U (xA) = A  
jxM + "  xM j = A " = U (xB) = B  12 jxaM   "  xM j  12 jxaM + "  xM j =
B   12 jxM   xM j   12 jxM + 2"  xM j = B   ": As the electorate median
voter is indi¤erent between voting one or the other Party, Party A and Party
B will tie as xi 2 (xM ; 1) will vote for Party B and xi 2 (0; xM ) will vote for
Party A. Thus, if partieslocations are at the same distance from the electorate
median voter, they tie. However, if one of the parties decide to implement a
more extreme policy (moving away from xM ) then, the other party can win.
So, the assumption we have used related to locate xA and xaM at the limit of
its platforms is adequate. Symmetrically, the results obtained can be applied
to the platforms where Party A is located at xA 2 (xM + "; 1) and Party B at
xaM 2 (0; xM   ") :
5 More than 2-leader equilibrium
In this section, we want to show that no matter the number of candidates
elected at the assembly and their locations, Party B cannot win. We continue
considering that the valence advantage of both parties is equal A = B : We
want to analyze whether the number of candidates elected at the assembly can
inuence on the results of the elections. We focus our study on the best response
of Party A, i.e. xA = xM :
Lemma 5: In every n-leader assembly Nash-equilibrium, leaders choose
symmetric positions with respect to the assembly median voter. We take as
a three-leader assembly Nash-equilibrium the following locations, x1B = x
a
M   ";
x2B = x
a
M and x
3
B = x
a
M + "; where " 2 (0; ") and the winning probabilities
coincide p1 = p2 = p3: As a four-leader assembly Nash-equilibrium we take
x1B = x
a
M   "; x2B = xaM   "2 ; x3B = xaM + "2 and x4B = xaM + "; where " 2 (0; ")
and the winning probabilities coincide p1 = ::: = p4:
Proposition 4 No matter the number of candidates elected at the assembly
XB =

x1B ; :::; x
m
B
	
and the location of the assembly median voter xaM , the
strategy xA = xM will assure the victory of Party A.
Proof. For xA = xM ; we start considering a three-leader assembly equilibrium:
XB =

x1B ; x
2
B ; x
3
B
	
: Let the assembly median voter location be xaM = xM .
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We nd that the electorate median voter position will vote for Party A, as the
utility of xi = xM is ui (xA; A) = A   jxM   xM j = A > E [ui (LB ; B)] =
B   13 jxM   (xaM   ")j   13 jxM   (xaM )j  13 jxaM + "  (xM )j = B   2"3 : As xaM = xM ; any citizen located at xi 2
(0; xM   ") and xi 2 (xM + "; 1) will be indi¤erent as they will obtain the
same utility of voting. We, thus, study the utility of xi 2 (xM   "; xM + ") :
Taking, for instance, the agent xi = xM   2"3 ; he obtains ui (xA; A) = A  xM    xM   2"3  = A   2"3 > E [ui (LB ; B)] =
B  13
xM   2"3   (xaM   ")  13 xaM    xM   2"3   13 xaM + "   xM   2"3  =
B   8"9 : Thus, Party A wins with the support of xi 2 (xM   "; xM + ") : This
result is equivalent to any assembly median voter location xaM 2 (0; xM ) as
Party A have the support of at least xi 2 [xM ; 1] : Symmetrically, if the assembly
median voter location is xaM 2 (xM ; 1) at least any citizen located at the left
of the electorate median voter position xi 2 [0; xM ] will support Party A, as
ui (xA; A) > E [ui (LB ; B)] :
This can be spread to any n-candidate assembly equilibrium. Applying the
same case to a four-leader assembly equilibrium: XB =

x1B ; x
2
B ; x
3
B ; x
4
B
	
; with
xA = x
a
M = xM , the electorate median voter xi = xM obtains ui (xA; A) =
A   jxM   xM j = A > E [ui (LB ; B)] = B   14 jxM   (xaM   ")j  14
xM    xaM   "2  14 xaM + "2   xM   14 jxaM + "  (xM )j = B   3"4 :
We can conclude that Figure 2 can show the results for any n-leader as-
sembly equilibrium when Lemma 1 is satised, which only consider symmetric
candidates around the assembly median voter.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the options of a party implementing Participatory
Democracy (Party B) to win elections against a traditional downsian party
(Party A). Our results are based on the valence advantage of the parties over
the opponent and the location of the assembly median voter position. Very
concisely, we make an introductory analysis to see whether the options of Party
B to win elections are increased by the number of nal elected candidates at the
assembly.
We have started analyzing the di¤erent strategies of both parties according
to their valence advantage over the opponent. Under the belief that the party
with valence advantage wins, we have shown that this is not the case when Party
B has a small valence advantage over Party A, as we found two strategies in
which Party A can win: xA = xM  "2 and xA = xM+ "2 : On the contrary, valence
advantage of Party A guarantees its victory at any location xA 2 [0; 1] : In those
cases in which valence characteristic of both parties are equivalent, Party A
can win in strategies situated between the two candidates location of Party B
xA 2 [xM   "; xM + "]. Under A = B , this implies that the distance from the
median voter will be lower than ": Conversely, when Party B has an important
valence advantage over Party A, this allow candidates to locate far from the
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median voter position (see Figure 1), which can lead to stimulate polarized or
extremist policies.
We have also taking into consideration the case in which there is uncertainty
about the valence advantage over the opponent party. In this case, parties
will locate in that political position that maximizes its expected probability to
win, that is, in that location where the party wins if it has valence advantage
and where it has more chances to win when it has not valence advantage and
the other party decides to carry out a "risky" strategy. Thus, uncertainty will
limit the strategies of both parties as Party A will locate at xA = xM   "2 or
xA = xM +
"
2 and Party B will minimize its distance with respect to the median
voter, " < ":
Under A = B ; we also evaluate the results of the elections when the
median voter of the assembly is di¤erent to the median voter of the electorate
(Figure 2). We obtain that Party A will locate around the electorate median
voter xA2 (xM   "; xM + "). The location of the assembly median voter xaM will
dene a close strategy of Party A to the electorate median voter xM according
to Proposition 3. We leave for further studies the results of the elections for the
cases in which there is valence advantage over the opponent, A 7 B :
Finally, we make an introductory analysis to the fact that more than 2 leaders
are elected in the assembly. We study the particular case of a 3 and a 4 leader
assembly equilibrium to see whether an odd or an even number of candidates
will inuence in the results of the elections. We conclude that, a priori, the
number of candidates do not inuence the nal result, as the assembly median
voter is mantained. We obtain the same results as in Figure 2. This will be due
to the imposition of Lemma 1, in which candidates has to locate symmetrically
around the median voter position, xM : Further study should be focused on the
results with asymmetric multi-candididate locations for any valence advantage
situation A 7 B :
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